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THE EFFICACY OF STRASBOURG LAW
Mark W. Janis*
This article explores what we seem to know and what it might be
useful to know about the efficacy of the 1950 European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.' It concludes
that, though we know quite a lot of detail about compliance with
Strasbourg law, we should be a little more careful about claiming too
much success for the system. For an international legal system,
Strasbourg law is, from what we can tell, remarkably efficacious, but it is
far from (anything but relatively) perfect.
Although one can define terms like "compliance," "obedience," and
"efficacy" to make them distinguishable, it seems that virtually all studies
about how Strasbourg law "works" do not do so. Talk about Strasbourg
law "working" or not, of it being "efficacious," "effective," or
"successful" or not, of there being "compliance" with its norms or
judgments or not, of its rules being "respected"
or "put into
practice" or
•
2
not, makes all these terms more or less interchangeable. Though one
could also analyze Strasbourg law using a break-down of levels of
compliance,' it appears more fruitful to break up the Strasbourg efficacy
* William F. Starr Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law.

1. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
November 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5, U.K.T.S. 71. The Convention enumerates individual
human rights that member states, now 41, agree to protect. It also establishes a European Court of
Human Rights which, along with the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, both based in
Strasbourg, France, control and supervise enforcement of the rights against member states. For almost
fifty years, there also existed a European Commission of Human Rights responsible, inter alia, for
screening applications, reaching friendly settlements, and reporting on claims. Protocol No. 11 to the
Convention, opened for signature on May 11, 1994, merged the Commission and the Court as of
November 1, 1998. The relatively complicated mechanics of the Strasbourg human rights system are
set forth, among other places, in MARK JANIS, RICHARD KAY & ANTHONY BRADLEY, EUROPEAN
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter JANIS, KAY & BRADLEY];
DAVID HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1995); P. VAN DIJK
& G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
(2d ed. 1990).
2. There is, I think, no harm in this. Much excellent discussion of compliance questions in
international law proceeds similarly. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey
InternationalLaw?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997).
3. Harold Koh helpfully distinguishes coincidence, conformity, compliance, and obedience
between norms and practice. See id. at 2600-01. Looking at the motivation of those who appear to
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studies into three categories depending upon the kind of "law" they
explore: (1) judgments (and decisions), (2) legal rules, and (3) the legal
system itself. This yields some interesting comparisons
Studies of the efficacy of Strasbourg judgments and decisions are the
most numerous. There are a great many reports on and examinations of
the effects of individual judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights, and the decisions of the European Commission of Human Rights
and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe Almost all of
these reports or commentaries are interesting and informative. However,
by their very nature, they fail to provide a general picture. The individual
case studies must be read together and compared in order to yield some
overall conclusion about whether there has been compliance with
Strasbourg judgments and decisions.
It is just this sort of general study that is most lacking. Some of the
work asserts to be comprehensive, but is frankly disappointing, being
largely uninformative. Other work provides more evidence,7 but is still
obey judgments, Richard Kay distinguishes behavioral explanations based on "prudential calculation"
from those grounded on "law following." Richard S. Kay, The European Human Rights System as a
( forthcoming 2000) [hereinafter Kay].
System of Law, 6 COLUM. J. EUR. L. __, at __
4. Benedict Kingsbury has provided a persuasive account of how definitions of compliance with
international law vary depending on the theory of law that one adopts, and I gratefully acknowledge
that his insight has helped me break up compliance into categories of "law," albeit my own. See
generally Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions
of InternationalLaw, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 345 (1998).
5. There are both official and unofficial reports and commentary. For example, the Council of
Europe has a web-site reporting, usually in a sentence or two, responses of states to judgments of the
See European Court of Human Rights, (visited Nov. 29, 1999)
Strasbourg Court.
<http://www.dhcour.coe.fr/eng/effects.html>. For an example of an official report, in an entry on
Jersild v. Denmark, September 23, 1994, Series A, No 298, the Council of Europe's web-site reports:
"On 24 January 1995 the Special Court of Review gave leave for the case against Mr. Jersild and
Others to be reopened." European Court of Human Rights (visited Nov. 29, 1999)
<http://www.dhcour.coe.fr/eng/effects.html>. As an example of unofficial commentary, an important
case, like Sunday Times, Judgment of April 26, 1979, Series A, No. 30, 2 EUR. HUM. RTS. REP. 245,
can evoke many articles about the compliance or not of a state, e.g. N.V. Lowe, Contempt of Court Act
1981, 1982 PUB. L. 20; S.H. Bailey, The Contempt of Court Act 1981, 45 MOD. L. REV. 301 (1982);
Wong, The Sunday Times Case: Freedom of Expression Versus English Contempt-of-Court Law in the
European Court of Human Rights, 1 J. INT'L L. & POL. 35 (1984).
6. For example, in 1993, Peter Leuprecht, then the Director of Human Rights of the Council of
Europe, promised a book chapter the purpose of which was "to show that judgments of the European
Court of Human Rights and decisions of the Committee of Ministers under Article 32 of the European
Convention on Human Rights are not only legally binding, but actually executed." Peter Leuprecht,
The Execution of Judgments and Decisions, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 791 (Macdonald et al. eds., 1993). However, the chapter refers in substance only to
the formal language of the Convention itself and in no way substantiates the conclusion that "[o]n the
whole, the record of execution of judgments of the Court and decisions of the Committee of Ministers
is remarkably good." Id. at 800. Probably, the real goal of the chapter is hortatory; Lcuprecht
concludes: "It is to be hoped that the States concerned will continue to take bonafide all the measures
necessary to execute the Court's judgments and the Committee of Ministers' decisions, and that the
Committee itself will confirm and develop its now well-established practice to use its powers fully and
responsibly, without being impeded by considerations of political expediency." Id.
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rather impressionistic.8 The most impressive study of compliance with
Strasbourg judgments and decisions covers only the compliance record of
one country, the United Kingdom,9 although the twenty-nine cases
reviewed do constitute about 31 percent of all violations decided in the
period.'0 This nuanced study of the United Kingdom's compliance record
shows how difficult it can be to tell if Strasbourg judgments and decisions
have been executed properly in practice." Moreover, the study concludes
that though in many cases it seems that the United Kingdom has complied
with adverse judgments and decisions," in other cases there had been
doubtful compliance or by some assessments even non-compliance. 4 It
may well be that the record of executing Strasbourg judgments is no worse
than the record of many domestic courts," but one must be careful not to
7. For example, in 1996, the then-President of the Strasbourg Court, Rolv Ryssdal, reviews the
compliance record of the Court, giving about ten examples of cases either where he notes good
compliance such as Germany changing its rules
about the cost of translators in criminal proceedings as
a result of Luedicke, Belkacem & Koc, Judgment of November 28, 1978, Series A, No. 29, or where
compliance was long-delayed (i.e., Belgium taking eight years to implement the amendments to its
family law called for by Marckx, Judgment of June 13, 1979, Series A, No. 31). See Rolv Ryssdal,
The Enforcement System Set Up Under the European Convenrion on Human Rights, in COMPLIANCE
WITH JUDGMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 49, 54 (Bulterman & Kuijer eds., 1996).
8. Ryssdal concludes that "to date judgments of the European Court of Human Rights have, I
would say, not only generally but always been complied with by the Contracting States concerned."
Id. at 67. However, in the same volume, another Strasbourg Court judge, S.K. Martens, in a
commentary on Judge Ryssdal's contribution, reaches a slightly more pessimistic conclusion: "For my
part, I also have the impression that as a rule respondent States, after a judgment finding a violation,
do modify their legislation sooner or later. There are, however, exceptions." S.K. Martens,
Commentary, in COMPLIANCE WITH JUDGMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 71, 73 (Bulterman &
Kuijer eds., 1996). Martens cited three examples of probable non-compliance including the absence of
adequate remedial legislation by Ireland in Norris, Judgment of October 26, 1988, Series A, No. 142,
and by the Netherlands in Benthem, Judgment of October 23, 1985, Series A, No. 1985. See id.
9. See Robin R. Churchill & J.R. Young, Compliance with Judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights and Decisions of the Committee of Ministers: The Experience of the United Kingdom,
1975-1987, 62 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 283 (1991) [hereinafter Churchill & Young].
10. See id. at 284.
11. "This paper also demonstrates some of the problems involved in carrying out a study of
compliance with judgments of the Court and decisions of the Committee of Ministers .... The relevant
law is not always very accessible (e.g., in relation to prisoners), nor is it always easy to ascertain how
the law applies in practice (e.g., in relation to the treatment of detainees in Northern Ireland)." Id. at
346.
12. These cases include Campbell & Cosans concerning corporal punishment, Judgment of
February 25, 1982, Series A, No. 48; Gillow concerning housing laws in Guernsey, Judgment of
November 24, 1986, Series A, No. 109; and Young, James & Webster concerning labor unions and the
closed shop, Judgment of August 13, 1980, Series A, No. 44. See id.
13. Churchill & Young conclude that as a result of Sunday Times, Judgment of April 26, 1979,
Series A, No. 30, "there was no sign of any attempt to review the reform of the law of contempt
against the touchstone of the European Convention, with the result that the extent of compliance
remains uncertain." Id.
14. There was no reform of the law authorizing corporal punishment in the Isle of Man after
Tyrer, Judgment of April 25, 1978, Series A, No. 26, although the authors could find no example of
corporal punishment being imposed in subsequent practice. See id. at 286-87.
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go too far in asserting a nearly perfect record for compliance with
Strasbourg judgments and decisions. 6
The second category of efficacy, compliance with Strasbourg's legal
rules, ought, in a way, to be even more important than the first. After all,
given the large number of alleged violations of European human rights
law and the small number of cases that ultimately reach the Strasbourg
Court, 17 most meaningful enforcement of Strasbourg's substantive law
must take place before national courts.'" There are a number of studies
that discuss the ways in which the substantive legal rules of the Strasbourg
Convention figure or not as rules of decision in the domestic legal systems
of the member states.' 9 There is also work available that discusses the
effect of Strasbourg institutional case law on municipal judicial
proceedings. What is missing are general studies about how Strasbourg
legal rules, whether in the form of the Convention's substantive provisions

15. One need go no further than the difficulties of enforcing school desegregation following the
U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), to see
how much the practice of domestic law can vary from its judgments. That we tend to worry rather
more about the efficacy of international law than about the efficacy of domestic law is probably due to
the lingering doubt many share about international law being "law" at all, a doubt that goes back to the
very origins of the discipline. See Mark Janis, Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioningof "International
Law," 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 405 (1984).
16. For example, "[tihe [European] Convention's reputation as a bulwark against arbitrary
government interference stems at least in part from the fact that the decisions of its judicial
enforcement organs, the European Court of Human Rights ("Court") and the European Commission of
Human Rights ("Commission"), are almost universally respected and implemented by the twenty-four
European nations ("Contracting States") that have ratified the Convention." Laurence R. Helfer,
Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 133,
133-34 (1993).
17. The European Commission of Human Rights always had as one of its chief functions the
filtering of cases so as to yield a reasonable number of cases for the system. As early as 1960, one
commentator, noting that 710 of the first 713 individual applications to Strasbourg had been deemed
inadmissible, remarked that cases "denying the individual further hearing before an international
tribunal, form by far the most significant part of the jurisprudence of the Commission." Gordon Weil,
Decisions on Inadmissible Applications by the European Commission of Human Rights, 54 AM. J.
INT'L L. 874, 874 (1960). Though the number of cases heard by the Strasbourg Court has skyrocketed
from only about one per year in the 1960s, to two or three each year in the 1970s, to almost twenty per
year in the 1980s, to more than 100 annually in the 1990s, there are thousands of applications each year
that never reach the Court. See JANIS, KAY & BRADLEY, supra note 1, at 36-37, 70-71.
18. See id. at 428-29.
19. One of the most comprehensive, though now somewhat dated, general surveys is A.
DRzEMczEwsKI, THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION IN DOMESTIC LAW (1983). Reviews
of individual countries can more easily be kept up-to-date. See, e.g., Ulf Bernitz, The Incorporationof
the European Human Rights Convention into Swedish Law- A Half Measure, 38 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L
L. 178 (1995); lain Cameron, The Swedish Experience of the European Convention on Human Rights
Since Incorporation,48 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 20 (1999).
20. See Jorg Polakiewicz & Valerie Jacob-Foltzer, The European Human Rights Convention in
Domestic Law: The Impact of Strasbourg Case-Law in States Where Direct Effect is Given to the
Convention, 12 HUM. RTS. L.J. 65, 121 (1991).
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or in the precedent-like norms created by the Strasbourg institutions, have
or have not influenced the actual practice of states or governments. 21
The third category of efficacy, the efficacy of the legal system of
Strasbourg itself, is both the most difficult to gauge and, probably, the
most important.
International law is sometimes accused of being
irrelevant, but increasingly it seems that even ordinary critics of the
function of law in international relations have come to acknowledge that
international law and international legal institutions are playing
increasingly important roles in international society.2 How, though, to
determine the real impact of international law on international society? In
particular, are the many assertions about the overall efficacy of the
Strasbourg legal system at the end of the day merely impressionistic? 3
Understanding how deeply a legal system permeates and regulates a
society, especially an international society like Europe, may always be
more a study in theory than of practice. This is not to say that the
theoretical aspects of the question of the deep-rootedness or not of an
international legal system will not be illuminating. For example, when
explaining to others the nature and efficacy of the Strasbourg legal system,
it may be useful to employ some of the ideas from the theoretical
paradigm for legal systems in general devised by H.L.A. Hart. 24 Hart
grounds much of his theory of a legal system upon a distinction between
primary and secondary rules: primary rules being rules of obligation and
secondary rules being rules that have to do with the functioning of the
system, including rules about making and changing primary rules, as well
as a rule of recognition that calls upon actors within the system to agree
upon what is and what is not a legitimate legal rule.25
21. There is some anecdotal evidence, though, available both in some of the records of the
enforcement or not of individual Strasbourg judgments and in some of the reviews of the respect paid
to Strasbourg legal rules. See, e.g., Churchill & Young, supra note 9.
22. See Robert 0. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38
HARV. INT'L L.J. 487 (1997); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International
Relations Theory: A DualAgenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993).
23. 1 am as guilty as anyone in making grand claims about the efficacy of the Strasbourg legal
system: "European human fights law provides, therefore, not only the most important body of case
law about the substance of international human fights law, but one of the most refreshing and
interesting examples of an effective international legal process." JANIS ET AL., supra note 1, at 6. And
saying this alone: "What makes European human fights law special is not only its increasing case load,
but also its effectiveness." MARK JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 267 (3d ed.
1999) [hereinafter JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION].
24. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter HART]. My views on
Hart and Strasbourg law have developed thanks to the insights of Richard Kay. Along with Anthony
Bradley, we have elaborated something of a common position. See JANIS, KAY & BRADLEY, supra
note 1, at 4-8. The paragraph above is only a short form of all that can be done to describe and explain
the Strasbourg legal system employing Hart's notions. See Kay, supra note 3, at_.
25. Although Hart's theory can be illuminating for understanding the role of international law in
international society, Hart's own treatment of international law is disappointing. See HART, supra
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It is convenient to describe the Strasbourg system as follows: there
are primary rules, especially the substantive human rights norms in the
European Convention, and secondary rules, including those in the
Convention establishing the international enforcement machinery of the
Strasbourg Court, which are tasked with the application, interpretation,
and adjudication of the primary rules vis-A-vis the member states. What
makes the Strasbourg legal system a more thorough-going international
legal system than, say United Nations human rights law, is that Strasbourg
displays a much more settled and accepted system of secondary rules and
institutions. Moreover, the actors within the system, both governments
and individual litigants, as well as their lawyers, recognize the Strasbourg
rules and the Strasbourg institutions as legitimate.
This last aspect, recognition of legitimacy, 26 may bbe the most crucial
"practical" test for the third sort of efficacy analysis, i.e., the efficacy of
the Strasbourg legal system. Yet, testing recognition of the legitimacy of
the Strasbourg system is very difficult and largely untried. It is much
more usual to simply make positive assertions about the efficacy of the
Strasbourg legal system." Are there more quantifiable ways of testing the
system's efficacy?
Elsewhere, this author has suggested four possible tests: (1) case load
in the European Court of Human Rights, (2) acceptance of what were the
two optional clauses of the European Convention," (3) growth in the
number of states joining the Council of Europe and ratifying the
Convention, and (4) an increasing recognition of the legitimacy of the

note 24, at 213-37. This is probably due to his uncharacteristic reliance on rather simplistic positivist
notions of the nature of international law, notions that I have criticized elsewhere. See, e.g., Mark
Janis, Individualsas Subjects of InternationalLaw, 17 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 61 (1984).
26. Legitimacy in international law has been most persuasively explored by Thomas Franck. See
THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990).

27. I do so myself, not only in the two places mentioned above in footnote 23, see JANIS, KAY &
BRADLEY, supra note 1, at 6; JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 23, at 271, but most recently in
Mark Janis, Russia and the 'Legality' of Strasbourg Law, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 93 (1997) [hereinafter
Janis, Legality]. Other such assertions are legion. As early as 1980, when the Strasbourg Court had
rendered only about forty judgments, the then-President of the Court, Sir Humphrey Waldock, wrote
that whether "the system set up by the European Convention on Human Rights is, in general, effective
is not, I believe, today open to serious question." Humphrey Waldock, The Effectiveness of the System
Set Up by the European Convention on Human Rights, 1 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1, 1 (1980). Hundreds of
judgments later, Strasbourg Judge Juan Antonio Carrillo Salcedo remarked similarly: "The European
Convention constitutes, therefore, the first effective regional enforcement mechanism for human
rights." Carrillo Salcedo, The Place of the European Convention in International Law, in THE
EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 15, 17 (Macdonald et al. eds., 1993).

28. Article 25 provided the right of individuals to petition the Commission and Article 46 gave
the Court jurisdiction to hear cases after they have been considered by the Commission. Both
provisions are now compulsory after the amendments made to the Convention by Protocol No. 11,
effective November 1, 1998. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, November 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.

2000]

THE EFFICACY OF STRASBOURG LAW

system. 29 The first three tests are easily quantifiable and satisfied
impressively.3 ° To some extent, of course, the fourth test, recognition of
the legitimacy of Strasbourg law, can be gleaned from the other three tests.
The burgeoning case load of the Court, the now universal acceptance of
the optional clauses, and the doubled membership of European states in
the Strasbourg legal system all point to individuals, governments, and
lawyers in Europe taking the system more seriously, and perhaps to the
conclusion that the players increasingly recognize the system's legitimacy.
Yet, "increasing" recognition of Strasbourg's legitimacy is only
relative: there is "increased" legitimacy at least compared to what went
before. Does that make it "enough recognition" to say the system is
properly "legitimate?" This second question is also relative: "enough
recognition" calls for a comparison of the levels of recognition between
the Strasbourg system and other legal systems, e.g., vis-A-vis both
domestic legal systems where legitimacies will vary from country to
country, say from an older Western democracy to a newer democratic
entrant such as Russia,3' and other international legal systems where
legitimacies will vary too, say from international economic law to the
international law regulating the use of force. 32 There are no such
comparisons of legitimacy in the literature. This may be because tests of
recognition of legitimacy do not easily form part of either legal or, even,
political analysis. Gauging recognition of legitimacy of legal systems may
be more a psychological, rather than a legal or political, exercise and in
any case difficult to ascertain in any sort of definite way.33 This may well
be true for most any legal system, domestic or international.

29. See Janis, Legality, supra note 27, at 95-96.
30. Not only has the case load in Strasbourg exploded, but the governments of all member states
are now expected to accept both optional clauses (realistically they are now "optional" clauses) and
membership in the system has almost doubled from the original twenty-two member states before the
end of the Cold War in 1989. See id. These successes have led to the need to radically reform the
control machinery of Strasbourg in Protocol No. 11 that will merge the Commission and the Court.
See JANIS, KAY & BRADLEY, supra note 1, at 88-118.
31. See Janis, Legality, supra note 27, at 98-99.
32. 1 have argued elsewhere that there are different international legal systems that vary along a
"structural spectrum," some forms of international law being more "law-like" than others. See Mark
Janis, Do 'Laws' Regulate Nuclear Weapons? in NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 53,

60-61 (Pogany ed. 1987).
33. It may be that anecdotal evidence from the media demonstrates psychological acceptance
rather well. For example, it seems to me to be meaningful when cartoons are printed assuming
something of a knowledge of the Strasbourg system, for example, the one showing a student preparing
himself to be caned in class with the caption, "[y]our complete ignorance on every other subject is
only matched by your detailed knowledge of each provision on corporal punishment by the European
Court of Human Rights." PUNCH, March 10, 1982. Or when the main headline of a daily paper reads:
"£40,000 Present for IRA Families: Britain Pays Terrorist Court Costs Early." See DAILY MAIL,
Dec. 27, 1995, at 1.
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In conclusion, we do know rather a lot about compliance with
Strasbourg law, especially about the way in which specific Strasbourg
judgments and decisions have been executed or not in practice and about
the way in which national legal systems in Europe use or do not use
Strasbourg legal rules.
The sheer quantity of specific Strasbourg
judgments and decisions and the considerable body of law about domestic
employment of Strasbourg rules is encouraging. However, we seem to
know rather less about Strasbourg's overall compliance track record.
There could certainly be more work done about the efficacy of Strasbourg
judgments and decisions in general and the actual effect of Strasbourg
legal rules on government practices, though these are not easy subjects to
test. Most important, more might be ventured to study and analyze the
efficacy of the Strasbourg legal system itself, in particular about the way
the Strasbourg system is or is not accepted as legitimate by the individuals
and governments and their lawyers who do or do not employ it. Although
it may be difficult to ultimately answer questions about the "legitimacy"
of the Strasbourg system in any but impressionistic ways, it should be
possible to do more at least in the way of comparisons of legitimacy
between Strasbourg and both domestic legal systems and other
international legal systems.
A working hypothesis might be that
Strasbourg law compares rather favorably with many national legal
systems and very favorably indeed with most other international legal
systems in terms of both Strasbourg's legitimacy and its efficacy.
Compliance with Strasbourg law may not be perfect, but for an
international legal system, its efficacy is apparently relatively impressive.

